A Scoping Review in Defend Against Selfish Mining Attack in Bitcoin

Sandi Rahmadika1, Bruno Joachim Kweka1, Hyunwoo Kim1, and Kyung-Hyune Rhee2+
 

1Interdiscplinary Program of Information Security, Graduate School

2Department of IT Convergence and Application Engineering

Pukyong National University, Busan, Republic of Korea

{sandika, drbruno}@pukyong.ac.kr, kper951@naver.com, khrhee@pknu.ac.kr

 

Abstract

Bitcoin is widely adopted due to its popularity as a decentralized cryptocurrency. Regardless of its reputation, Bitcoin has been shown that its protocol is not incentive compatible for the miners. The adversary network enables to gain the unfair revenue by adapting the selfish mining strategy. To do so, the attacker does not have to possess 51% power of the total network. Moreover, this attack affects the rational miner to adopt the selfish mining strategy due to this strategy is more profitable than the honest. Selfish mining will damage the structure of Bitcoin blockchain if the attack continues to occur. The minority of adversary network will increase until becomes a majority network in the Bitcoin blockchain. In this sense, they will be able to take over the network and invalidate the transaction of the parties. In this paper, we thoroughly review the existing defenses against selfish mining strategy. In the last session, we remark several points that related to the strategies to prevent the selfish mining attack based on the prior works of literature.

Keywords: Bitcoin Blockchain, Selfish Mining, Strategy Defense, Unfair Revenue

 

+: Corresponding author: Kyung-Hyune Rhee

A12-1305, Daeyeon Campus, Pukyong National University, Yongso-ro 45, Nam-gu, Busan (48513),

Republic of Korea. Telp: +82 51 6296247, Fax: +82 51 6264887

 

IT Convergence Practice (INPRA), Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 18-26, September 2018 [pdf]