An eCK-Secure One Round Authenticated Key Exchange
Protocol
with Perfect Forward Security
Hai Huang
Zhejiang Sci-Tech University
Hangzhou, 310000 P.R. China
haihuang1005@gamil.com
Abstract
This paper investigates the two-pass (one round)
authenticated key exchange protocol in the enhanced
Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model with perfect forward
security against active adversary. Currently,
there exist no authenticated key exchange protocols which
are provably secure in the eCK
model and meanwhile achieve perfect forward security
against active adversary in one round.
We propose a new two-pass (one round) authenticated key
exchange protocol which enjoys following
desirable properties. First, our protocol is shown secure
in the eCK model under the gap
Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption. Moreover, our protocol
does not use the NAXOS transformation,
the drawback of which will be discussed in the
introduction. Second, under the same assumption,
we prove that our protocol achieves perfect forward
security against active adversary in one round.
To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is the first
two-pass (one round) authenticated key
exchange protocol provably secure in the eCK model and
achieving perfect forward security against
active adversary.
Keywords: Authenticated key exchange, eCK model, Perfect forward
security, Provably secure
Journal of Internet
Services and Information Security (JISIS), 1(2/3):
32-43, August 2011 [pdf]