TMQV: A Strongly eCK-secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol
without Gap Assumption
Jiaxin Pan and Libin Wang
School of Computer, South China Normal University
Guangzhou 510631, China
csplator@gmail.com, lbwang@scnu.edu.cn
Abstract
In this paper, we propose an authenticated key exchange
(AKE) protocol under the computational
Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption with respect to the
strengthened eCK-security (seCK-security) of
Sarr et al.. To date, many AKE protocols either are
provably secure under a rather strong and nonstandard
assumption named as the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH)
assumption, or fall to practical attacks
on the intermediate result leakage which can be captured
by the seCK model. In order to remove
the gap assumption and to achieve stronger security
requirements, we present the TMQV protocol
using the twinning technique and the MQV key derivation
method. With the help of trapdoor test
theorem, TMQV is provably seCK-secure under the standard
CDH assumption in the random oracle
model. Compared with the related works, TMQV achieves not
only stronger security but also higher
implementation efficiency with weaker cryptographic
assumptions.
Keywords: Strengthened eCK model, authenticated key exchange,
Diffie-Hellman assumption, trapdoor test
Journal of Internet
Services and Information Security (JISIS), 1(2/3):
107-124, August 2011 [pdf]