On the (Im)possibility Results for Strong Attack Models
for Public Key Cryptsystems
Yutaka Kawai1, Yusuke Sakai2 and
Noboru Kunihiro1
1University of Tokyo
5-1-5 Kashiwanoha, Kashiwa-shi
Chiba 277-8561, Japan
kawai@it.k.u-tokyo.ac.jp, kunihiro@k.u-tokyo.ac.jp
2The University of Electro-Communications
1-5-1 Chofugaoka, Chofu-shi,
Tokyo 182-8585, Japan
y-sakai@uec.uec.ac.jp
Abstract
In this paper, we discuss the strong attack model
security for public key encryption scheme and
digital signature scheme. Recently, Barbosa and Farshim
introduced strong chosen ciphertext attack
(SCCA) which is stronger than chosen ciphertext attack.
The main motivation of this paper is to find
an essential mechanism of secure schemes under strong
attack model. So, we prove several impossibility
results under SCCA model. For the purpose, we classify
two types of public key encryption
schemes: First model is ¢³ = (Gen;Enc;Dec) which we call
the setup-free model, second model is
¢³ = (Setup;Gen;Enc;Dec) which we call the setup model. We
prove that it is impossible to reduce
indistinguishability under strong chosen ciphertext
attack (IND-SCCA) security to any other weaker
security notion under black-box analysis in the standard
model. Second, when a public key encryption
scheme is modeled as ¢³ = (Setup;Gen;Enc;Dec), we show
that it is impossible that the security
of SCCA is proven if the reduction is setup-preserving
black-box reductions which we define in this
paper. From the similar discussion, we prove
impossibilities for digital signature schemes. Finally,
we discuss the essential mechanism to construct IND-SCCA
secure public key encryption scheme in
the standard model.
Keywords: public key cryptsystems, attack models, encryptions
Journal of Internet
Services and Information Security (JISIS), 1(2/3):
125-139, August 2011 [pdf]