A New Exponentiation Algorithm Resistant
to Combined Side Channel Attack

Hyungdong Kim¹, Yongje Choi², Dooho Choi², and Jaecheol Ha^1*

¹Hoseo University, Asan, ChungNam, Republic of Korea
karuceace@nate.com, jcha@hoseo.edu

²Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), Daejeon, Republic of Korea
{choiyj, dhchoi}@etri.re.kr

Abstract

Since two different types of side channel attacks based on passive information leakage and active fault injection are independently considered as implementation threats on cryptographic modules, most countermeasures have been separately developed according to each attack type. But then, Amiel et al. proposed a combined side channel attack in which an attacker combines these two methods to recover the secret key in an RSA implementation. In this paper, we show that the BNP (Boscher, Naciri, and Prouff) algorithm for RSA, which is an SPA/FA-resistant exponentiation method, is also vulnerable to the combined attack. In addition, we propose a new exponentiation algorithm resistant to power analysis and fault attack as well as the combined attack. The proposed secure exponentiation algorithm can be employed to strengthen the security of CRT-RSA..

Keywords: Side Channel Attack, Fault attack, Combined Attack, Exponentiation, CRT-RSA Algorithm

+: Corresponding author: JaeCheol Ha 
Deptartment of Information Security, Hoseo University,
165 Sechul-Ri, Baebang-Eup, Asan-Si, Chungnam, 336-795 Korea, Tel: +82-(0)41-540-5991
Web: http://islab.hoseo.ac.kr/jcha

Journal of Internet Services and Information Security (JISIS), 3(3/4): 17-27, November  2013 [pdf]