Power Analysis Attacks on the
Right-to-Left Square-Always Exponentiation Algorithm Jaecheol Ha1+, Yongje Choi2, Dooho
Choi2+, and Hoonjae
Lee3 1Hoseo
University, Asan, ChungNam,
Korea jcha@hoseo.edu 2ETRI,
Daejeon, Korea {choiyj, dhchoi}@etri.re.kr 3Dongseo
University, Busan, Korea hjlee@dongseo.ac.kr Abstract The naive implementation of an exponentiation used
in public key cryptography may reveal a secret key to the attacker by several
side-channel attacks. Recently, a novel square-always exponentiation algorithm
based on trading multiplications for squarings is
proposed. This algorithm for RSA implementation is faster than existing
regular countermeasures against side-channel attacks. This paper suggests
that the right-to-left square-always exponentiation algorithm is vulnerable
to some sidechannel attacks: collision
distance-based doubling, chosen-message SPA, and CPA-based combined attacks.
The chosen-message SPA attack can be intactly
applied to this algorithm. The other two attacks are variants of the doubling
attack and SPA-based combined attack, respectively. In addition, the paper
presents an improved right-to-left square-always algorithm resistant to
existing and proposed power analysis attacks by using the additive message
blinding method and the message update technique before the main iterative
operation. Keywords: RSA
Cryptosystem, Side-Channel Attack, Simple Power Analysis, Square-Always
Exponentiation +: Corresponding author: Jaecheol Ha Chungnam,
336,795, Korea, Tel: +82-(0)41-540-5991, Web: http://islab.hoseo.ac.kr/jcha Journal of Internet Services and Information Security (JISIS), 4(4): 38-51, November 2014 [pdf] |