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eCK Secure Single Round ID-based Authenticated Key
Exchange Protocols with Master Perfect Forward Secrecy (Extended Version) 2Indian
Institute of Technology, Patna,
India som@iitp.ac.in Abstract Recently, LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model for
Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols that covers many attacks on
existing models. An ID-based AKE protocol with Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) (respectively Master Perfect
Forward Secrecy (MPFS)) ensures that revelation of the static keys of the parties (respectively the master secret key of the private key generator), must not
compromise even a single bit of the session keys of the past sessions between
the parties. Currently, to the
best of our knowledge, there is no ID-based eCK
secure single round AKE protocol with either PFS or MPFS. In our preliminary
version we have proposed, without
proofs, ID-based eCK secure single round AKE
protocols with PFS and MPFS in the random oracle model. To achieve this, we also have
constructed ID-based eCK secure single round AKE
protocols, one without Master Forward Secrecy (MFS) and one with MFS, almost at the same
computational cost as the existing efficient ID-based eCK
Secure Single Round AKE protocols. In this full version, we provide proofs to
show that all of our protocols are secure under the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) problem. Keywords: Authenticated Key Exchange, ID-based cryptography, eCK-secure, perfect forward secrecy +: Corresponding author: Tapas Pandit Stat-Math Unit,
Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, Pin - 700108, India, Tel:
+91-33-2575-3461 Journal of
Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Computing, and Dependable Applications (JoWUA), Vol. 5, No. 4, pp.
65-85, December 2014 [pdf] |